Grazer Philosophische Studien 10:73-86 (1980)
Jonathan Bennett's two interpretations of Kant's Third Paralogism are shown to be inadequate. The Third Paralogism attempts to show that rational psychology provides an inadequate basis for the application of the concepts of "personhood" and "substance". The criteria for the application of "personhood" and "substance" must be empirical, and in the case of "personhood" they are bodily criteria. These criteria are available to each of us but only upon pains of abandoning what Bennett calls the Cartesian basis, i.e. rational psychology
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