Mind, Mortality and Material Being

Sophia 50 (1):25-37 (2011)
Many religiously minded materialist philosophers have attempted to understand the doctrine of the survival of death from within a physicalist approach. Their goal is not to show the doctrine false, but to explain how it can be true. One such approach has been developed by Peter van Inwagen. After explaining what I call the duplication objection, I present van Inwagen’s proposal and show how a proponent might attempt to solve the problem of duplication. I argue that the very features of the view that aid the proponent in responding to the duplication objection entails the possibility of an impossible state of affairs—that two distinct persons can at the same time be identical with the same bundle of material simples. The religiously minded materialist is caught between the horns of a dilemma. One’s view regarding human persons must be robust enough to account for personal identity over time, and so not fall to the duplication objection. At the same time, the view must not entail the possibility of two persons temporarily having complete coincident existence
Keywords van Inwagen  Personal identity  Survival of death  Materialism  God  Metaphysics
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DOI 10.1007/s11841-010-0163-y
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References found in this work BETA
van Inwagen Peter (1995). Dualism and Materialism. Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):475-488.
Peter van Inwagen (1978). The Possibility of Resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (2):114-121.

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Citations of this work BETA
Thomas Atkinson (2016). Conceivability, Possibility and the Resurrection of Material Beings. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (2):115-132.

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