Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):904-911 (2016)

Authors
James Andow
University of East Anglia
Abstract
Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have an unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the effect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy.
Keywords Intuitions  Methodology  Moral intuitions  Moral philosophy  Moral psychology  Experimental Philosophy  Reliability
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2016.1168794
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Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?James Andow - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):115-141.
Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?James Andow - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-27.

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