Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions

Abstract
Do philosophers use intuitions? Should philosophers use intuitions? Can philosophical methods (where intuitions are concerned) be improved upon? In order to answer these questions we need to have some idea of how we should go about answering them. I defend a way of going about methodology of intuitions: a metamethodology. I claim the following: (i) we should approach methodological questions about intuitions with a thin conception of intuitions in mind; (ii) we should carve intuitions finely; and, (iii) we should carve to a grain to which we are sensitive in our everyday philosophising. The reason is that, unless we do so, we don’t get what we want from philosophical methodology. I argue that what we want is information that will aid us in formulating practical advice concerning how to do philosophy responsibly/well/better.
Keywords Philosophical methodology  Experimental Philosophy  Intuition  Intuitions
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Reprint years 2015, 2016
DOI 10.1007/s13164-015-0247-2
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Ethics and Intuitions.Peter Singer - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):331-352.
Philosophy Without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA
How Distinctive Is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk?James Andow - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):515-538.

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