Grazer Philosophische Studien 18 (1):101-121 (1982)

Abstract
Voluntarism is the view that it is from our intimate awareness of the exercise of our wills in performing actions that we arrive at our concept of causality. This view has generally been thought to be indefensible since Hume attacked it in the Treatise and Enquiry. A variant of the position is stated and defended. The views of Castaiieda, and psychologists such as Maine de Biran, Michotte, and Piaget add clarity and enhance the plausibility of the view
Keywords Analytic Philosophy
Categories No categories specified
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ISBN(s) 0165-9227
DOI 10.5840/gps1982185
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