Why compatibilist intuitions are not mistaken: A reply to Feltz and Millan

Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):550-566 (2016)
Abstract
In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions. In a recent paper, Feltz and Millan have challenged this conclusion by claiming that most laypeople are only compatibilists in appearance and are in fact willing to attribute free will to people no matter what. As evidence for this claim, they have shown that an important proportion of laypeople still attribute free will to agents in fatalistic universes. In this paper, we first argue that Feltz and Millan’s error-theory rests on a conceptual confusion: it is perfectly acceptable for a certain brand of compatibilist to judge free will and fatalism to be compatible, as long as fatalism does not prevent agents from being the source of their actions. We then present the results of two studies showing that laypeople’s intuitions are best understood as following a certain brand of source compatibilism rather than a “free-will-no-matter-what” strategy.
Keywords free will  compatibilism  experimental philosophy  determinism  fatalism  moral responsibility
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2015.1082542
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.
An Essay on Free Will.van Inwagen Peter - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
An Error Theory for Compatibilist Intuitions.Adam Feltz & Melissa Millan - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):529-555.
Compatibilist Fatalism.Paul Russell - 2000 - In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 199--218.
The Contrariety of Compatibilist Positions.Saul Smilansky - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:293-309.
Experimental Philosophy and the Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism: A Survey.Florian Cova & Yasuko Kitano - 2014 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 22:17-37.
The Folk Argument Against Compatibilism.Gregg Caruso - 2012 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):56-89.
Added to PP index
2015-04-13

Total downloads
405 ( #6,977 of 2,210,472 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #12,043 of 2,210,472 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature