Why Don’t Philosophers Do Their Intuition Practice?

Acta Analytica 34 (3):257-269 (2019)
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I bet you don’t practice your philosophical intuitions. What’s your excuse? If you think philosophical training improves the reliability of philosophical intuitions, then practicing intuitions should improve them even further. I argue that philosophers’ reluctance to practice their intuitions highlights a tension in the way that they think about the role of intuitions in philosophy.

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James Andow
University of East Anglia

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References found in this work

Philosophy Without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
The Myth of the Intuitive.Max Emil Deutsch - 2015 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

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