Why don't we trust moral testimony?

Mind and Language 35 (4):456-474 (2020)
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Is there a problem with believing based on moral testimony? The intuition that there is a problem is a starting point for much research on moral testimony. To arbitrate between various attempts to account for intuitions about moral testimony, we need to know the exact nature of those intuitions. The current study investigates this empirically. The study confirms an asymmetry in the way we think about testimony about moral and descriptive matters and explores the extent to which this asymmetry is explained by different metaphysical beliefs about the relevant domains, or beliefs about the relative background levels of deception or disagreement.



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Author's Profile

James Andow
University of Manchester

References found in this work

A Defense of Moral Deference.David Enoch - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (5):229-258.
In defense of moral testimony.Paulina Sliwa - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):175-195.
What is Wrong With Moral Testimony?Robert Hopkins - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):611-634.

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