Are subjective measures of well-being 'direct'?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):115 - 130 (2011)
Subjective measures of well-being?measures based on answers to questions such as ?Taking things all together, how would you say things are these days?would you say you're very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy these days???are often presented as superior to more traditional economic welfare measures, e.g., for public policy purposes. This paper aims to spell out and assess what I will call the argument from directness: the notion that subjective measures of well-being better represent well-being than economic measures do because subjective measures (and subjective measures alone) are direct measures of well-being. My main thesis is that the argument begs the question against proponents of economic measures: it is based on a premise that they reject and that is no less in need of justification than the conclusion of the argument, namely, the proposition that well-being is constituted by subjectively experienced mental states. If subjective measures can be defended as valid measures of well-being at all, I will maintain, it is because they are (imperfect) indirect measures of well-being
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DOI 10.1080/00048400903401665
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References found in this work BETA
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics.L. W. Sumner - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Welfare and the Achievement of Goals.Simon Keller - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (1):27-41.

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Citations of this work BETA
Is It Possible to Measure Happiness?Erik Angner - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):221-240.
The Futile Search for True Utility.Roberto Fumagalli - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (3):325-347.
Are Measures of Well-Being Philosophically Adequate?Willem van der Deijl - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (3):209-234.
What If Well-Being Measurements Are Non-Linear?Daniel Wodak - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.

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