In Marcelo Carvalho (ed.), Encontro Nacional Anpof: Filosofia Antiga e Medieval. Anpof. pp. 329-341 (2013)

Lucas Angioni
University of Campinas
This chapter discusses the first part of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics A-33, 88b30-89a10. I claim that Aristotle is not concerned with an epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief in general. He is rather making a contrast between scientific knowledge (which is equivalent to explanation by the primarily appropriate cause) and some explanatory beliefs that falls short of capturing the primarily appropriate cause.
Keywords causality  demonstration  scientific explanation  essencialism  necessity
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References found in this work BETA

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
Aristotle's First Principles.Terence Irwin - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
The Fragility of Goodness.Martha Nussbaum - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):376-383.

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Romanos 1: menos filtro e mais próximo.Aislan Pereira - 2019 - Revista de Teologia 13 (23):94-113.
A Teoria Aristotélica da Demonstração Científica.Charles Andrade Santana - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Campinas, Brazil

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