Conhecimento e Opinião em Aristóteles (Segundos Analíticos I-33)

In Marcelo Carvalho (ed.), Encontro Nacional Anpof: Filosofia Antiga e Medieval. Anpof. pp. 329-341 (2013)
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This chapter discusses the first part of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics A-33, 88b30-89a10. I claim that Aristotle is not concerned with an epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief in general. He is rather making a contrast between scientific knowledge (which is equivalent to explanation by the primarily appropriate cause) and some explanatory beliefs that falls short of capturing the primarily appropriate cause.



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Lucas Angioni
University of Campinas

References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
Aristotle's first principles.Terence Irwin - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Fragility of Goodness.Martha Nussbaum - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):376-383.
Socrates, ironist and moral philosopher.Gregory Vlastos - 1991 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

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