It has been claimed that cognitive therapists endorse sets of uplifting beliefs BECAUSE the client feels better believing them: not because they lead towards greater verisimilitude, a purported cognitivists’ hallmark of rational choice. Since standard cognitive therapists sometimes ask us to choose sets of beliefs that interpret evidence on the basis of greater individual happiness (all other things being equal), this suggests that the basis of choice goes beyond rationality. I contend that the case against the rationality of cognitive therapy is not made if one allows a broadening of what to count as rational cognitive therapy. The rationality of therapy consists in how well it achieves its goal. My claim is that at least one goal is, or ought to be, greater information value of the client’ dialogues. Among other things, information values encode affect. Understanding reason in this way effectively transforms our understanding of rationality in a way that may be incommensurable with the standard view. If these radically divergent approaches to cognitive therapy are incommensurable, there is no way to discover that we are still talking about the same thing. So, a challenge for this competing view is to say on what basis the term cognitive therapy may be projectable. I identify some constraints on this project and sketch a possible solution.
Keywords Incommensurability  Cognitive Therapy  Rationality
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Rationality, Emotion, and Belief Revision: Waller's Move Beyond CBT & REBT.Will Angelette - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Practice 1 (3).
A Cognitive Self-Therapy : PI 138-97.Eugen Fischer - 2004 - In Erich Ammereller & Eugen Fischer (eds.), Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the Philosophical Investigations. Routledge. pp. 86--126.
Reliable Rationality.Fernando Broncano - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:49-59.
Thomistic Thought as a Metapsychological Meeting Ground.Eugene M. DeRobertis - 2010 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4):367-372.
Should We Change the Human Genome?Torbjörn Tännsjö - 1993 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 14 (3).


Added to PP index

Total views
218 ( #36,785 of 2,329,886 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #121,085 of 2,329,886 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes