Zygon 44 (3):699-718 (2009)
Extension of the system that includes the key substrates for sensation, perception, emotion, volition, and cognition, and all representational sources for cognition, supports the view that there is an extended mind and an extended body. These intellectual views can be made practical in a humanist system based on extensions and in religious systems based on extensions. Independently, there is also an institutional extension of secularism. Hence, I maintain, there are five principal forms of extension.
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References found in this work BETA
Reference and Generality: An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories.P. T. Geach - 1962 - Cornell University Press.
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Mindscapes and Landscapes: Exploring the Extended Mind.Leslie Marsh - 2009 - Zygon 44 (3):625-627.
The Importance of Physicalism in the Philosophy of Religion.Leonard Angel - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):141 - 156.
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