Disputatio 3 (4) (2021)

Rani Anjum
University of Tromsø (PhD)
Stephen Mumford
Durham University
Most theories of causation assume that it must involve some kind of necessity, or that the cause must be entirely sufficient for the effect. Others have already suggested that it should be possible to get a theory of causation from a theory of powers or dispositions. Such a project is far from complete but even here we find that the key point in a dispositional theory of causation has been lacking. This paper attempts to establish some of the most important principles of such a theory and in so doing turn the existing discussion in a new direction.
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