Against functionalist theories of consciousness

Mind and Language 9 (2):105-23 (1994)
Abstract
The paper contains an argument against functionalist theories of consciousness. The argument exploits an intuition to the effect that parts of an individual's brain that are not in use at a time t, can have no bearing on whether that individual is conscious at t. After presenting the argument, I defend it against two possible objections, and then distinguish it from two arguments to which it appears, on the surface to be similar
Keywords Consciousness  Functionalism  Mental States  Metaphysics  Mind
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1994.tb00219.x
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Readings in Philosophy of Psychology.Ned Block (ed.) - 1980 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mind and Meaning.Brian Loar - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
An Argument for the Identity Theory.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):17-25.

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Computationalism and the Locality Principle.David Longinotti - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):495-506.

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