Anomalous monism and the problem of explanatory force

Philosophical Review 98 (April):153-87 (1989)
Abstract
Concern about two problems runs through the work of davidson: the problem of accounting for the "explanatory force" of rational explanations, and the problem posed for materialism by the apparent anomalousness of psychological events. davidson believes that his view of mental causation, imbedded in his theory of "anomalous monism," can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. however, it is argued in this paper that davidson's program contains a fundamental inconsistency; that his metaphysics, while grounding the doctrine of anomalous monism, makes impossible a successful response to the problem of explanatory force in terms of a causal theory of action
Keywords Action Theory  Metaphysics  Mind  Davidson, D
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2185281
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,146
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Normative Force of Reasoning.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):660–686.
Semantic Normativity and Semantic Causality.Lei Zhong - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3).
Mental Causation and the Paradoxes of Explanation.Karsten R. Stueber - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):243-77.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Standard Objection to Anomalous Monism.Neil Campbell - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):373-82.
Davidson's Argument for Monism.Michael V. Antony - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):1-12.
Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism.Rex Welshon - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.
A Problem with Anomalous Monism.Bruce Goldberg - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (August):175-80.
The Argument for Anomalous Monism.Ted Honderich - 1982 - Analysis 42 (January):59-64.
The Inadequacy of Anomalous Monism as a Realist Theory of Mind.Louise M. Antony - 1994 - In Gerhard Preyer, F. Siebelt & A. Ulfig (eds.), Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Anomalous Monism.Julie Yoo - 2009 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist.Sophie Gibb - 2006 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

167 ( #26,463 of 2,152,003 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #66,127 of 2,152,003 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums