Are our concepts conscious state and conscious creature vague?

Erkenntnis 68 (2):239 - 263 (2008)
are sharp rather than vague, that they can have no borderline cases. On the other hand, many who take conscious states to be identical to, or realized by, complex physical states are committed to the vagueness of those concepts. In the paper I argue that conscious state and conscious creature are sharp by presenting four necessary conditions for conceiving borderline cases in general, and showing that some of those conditions cannot be met with conscious state. I conclude that conscious state is sharp, and the conclusion is then extended to conscious creature. The paper ends with a brief discussion of some implications
Keywords Consciousness  Phenomenal consciousness  Conscious state  Conscious creature  Phenomenology  Vagueness  Borderline case  Concept  Conception
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-007-9061-2
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References found in this work BETA
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Dover Publications.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA
Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness.Michael V. Antony - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538.

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