Breaking the Habit

Philosophy in the Contemporary World 13 (2):58-66 (2006)
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Abstract

Aristotle’s virtue ethics can teach us about the relationship between our habits and our actions. Throughout his works, Aristotle explains much about how one may develop a virtuous character, and little about how one might change from one character type to another. In recent years criminal law has been concerned with the issue of recidivism and how our system might reform the criminals we return to society more effectively. This paper considers how Aristotle might say a vicious person could change and what a penal system could do to facilitate such a transformation. It discusses how previous attempts to rehabilitate criminals may have failed because they do not address habit in the way that Aristotle advocates. This paper concludes that a rehabilitative model that addresses habit more aggressively than previous methods might be required to soften the hardest criminals.

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Audrey Anton
Western Kentucky University

Citations of this work

Sculpting Character: Aristotle's Voluntary as Affectability.Audrey L. Anton - 2016 - Labyrinth: An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics 18 (2):75-103.

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