Philosophical Studies 109 (1):1-16 (2002)
The use of expressions like ‘concepts of consciousness’, ‘kinds of consciousness’, and ‘meanings of ‘consciousness’’ interchangeably is ubiquitous within the consciousness literature. It is argued that this practice can be made sense of in only two ways. The first involves interpreting ‘concepts of consciousness’ and ‘kinds of consciousness’ metalinguistically to mean concepts expressed by ‘consciousness’ and kinds expressed by ‘consciousness’; and the second involves certain literal, though semantically deviant, interpretations of those expressions. The trouble is that researchers typically use the above expressions interchangeably without satisfying either way of doing so coherently. The result is much error and confusion, which is demonstrated in the works of philosophers currently writing on consciousness.
|Keywords||Concept Consciousness Kind Logic Semantics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Levels of Consciousness and Self-Awareness: A Comparison and Integration of Various Neurocognitive Views.Alain Morin - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):358-371.
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