Synthese 135 (1):1-12 (2003)
Two criticisms of Davidson's argument for monism are presented. The first is that there is no obvious way for the anomalism of the mental to do any work in his argument. Certain implicit premises, on the other hand, entail monism independently of the anomalism of the mental, but they are question-begging. The second criticism is that even if Davidson's argument is sound, the variety of monism that emerges is extremely weak at best. I show that by constructing ontologically ``hybrid'' events that are consistent with the premises and assumptions of Davidson's argument, but entail ontological dualism.
|Keywords||Anomalous Mental Metaphysics Monism Davidson, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Causation in the Argument for Anomalous Monism.Steven Yalowitz - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):183-226.
On Davidson's Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1992 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
Anomalous Monism and Physical Closure.Hancock Nancy Slonneger - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):175-185.
Supervenience and Anomalous Monism: Blackburn on Davidson.Nick Zangwill - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (1):59-79.
Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism.Rex Welshon - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.
Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist.Sophie Gibb - 2006 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads214 ( #18,549 of 2,178,176 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #73,172 of 2,178,176 )
How can I increase my downloads?