Defeasible Reasoning as a Cognitive Model
In Krister Segerberg (ed.), The Parikh Project. Seven Papers in Honour of Rohit. Uppsala Prints & Preprints in Philosophy (1996)
One of the most important developments over the last twenty years both in logic and in Artiﬁcial Intelligence is the emergence of so-called non-monotonic logics. These logics were initially developed by McCarthy , McDermott & Doyle , and Reiter . Part of the original motivation was to provide a formal framework within which to model cognitive phenomena such as defeasible inference and defeasible knowledge representation, i.e., to provide a formal account of the fact that reasoners can reach conclusions tentatively, reserving the right to retract them in the light of further information.
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