In Thomas Hurka (ed.), Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers From Sidgwick to Ewing. Oxford University Press. pp. 45-65 (2011)
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Ideal utilitarianism states that the only fundamental requirement of morality is to promote a plurality of intrinsic goods. This paper critically evaluates Hastings Rashdall’s arguments for ideal utilitarianism, while comparing them with G. E. Moore’s arguments. Section I outlines Rashdall’s ethical outlook. Section II considers two different arguments that he provides for its theory of rightness. Section III discusses his defence of a pluralist theory of value. Section IV argues that Rashdall makes a lasting contribution to the defence of ideal utilitarianism.
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References found in this work BETA
The Ethics of Religious Conformity.H. Sidgwick - 1896 - International Journal of Ethics 6 (3):273-290.
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Citations of this work BETA
Consequentialism, Climate Change, and the Road Ahead.Dale Jamieson - 2013 - Chicago Journal of International Law 13 (2):439-468.
Utilitarianism : Bentham and Rashdall.Robert Shaver - 2013 - In Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 292.
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Rashdall, Hastings (1858-1924).Anthony Skelton - 2016 [2013] - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 4325-4329.
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The New Intuitionism of Dr. Rashdall and Dr. Moore.J. G. Riddell - 1921 - Philosophical Review 30 (6):545-565.
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