Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):187 (2019)
| Authors |
|
| Abstract |
On the model-theoretic account, a sentence is logically true just in case it is true on all possible semantic interpretations. We dierentiate four ways one can interpret the modality 'possible' in this definition, and argue that one of these readings is not subject to the criticism levelled against the model-theoretic account by Etchemendy. By explicating the four readings we also draw some consequences for what linguistic evidence a selection of logical theories should be sensitive to.
|
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| DOI | 10.26686/ajl.v16i7.5914 |
| Options |
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Request removal from index
|
Download options
PhilArchive copy
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy Papers currently archived: 55,825
External links
(no proxy) Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver..
- Configure custom resolver
References found in this work BETA
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Foundations Without Foundationalism: A Case for Second-Order Logic.Stewart Shapiro - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
What 'Must' and 'Can' Must and Can Mean.Angelika Kratzer - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.
View all 38 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Are There Model-Theoretic Logical Truths That Are Not Logically True?Mario Gomez-Torrente - 2008 - In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 340-368.
On the Substitutional Characterization of First-Order Logical Truth.Matthew McKeon - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (3):205-224.
The Concept of Logical Consequence: An Introduction to Philosophical Logic.Matthew W. McKeon - 2010 - Peter Lang.
Tarski, Model Theory, and Logical Truth.John William Etchemendy - 1982 - Dissertation, Stanford University
On the Possibility of a Privileged Class of Logical Terms.Greg Ray - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):303 - 313.
Logical Consequence: A Defense of Tarski.Greg Ray - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (6):617 - 677.
A Defense of the Kripkean Account of Logical Truth in First-Order Modal Logic.M. McKeon - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (3):305-326.
A Defense of Contingent Logical Truths.Michael Nelson & Edward N. Zalta - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):153-162.
Etchemendy on Squeezing Arguments and Logical Consequence: A Reply to Griffiths.Kasper Christensen - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):803-816.
Formal and Informal Consequence.Owen Griffiths - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):9-20.
The Metaphysical Interpretation of Logical Truth.Tuomas Tahko - 2014 - In Penelope Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic: Logical Realism, Logical Anti-Realism and All Things In Between. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 233-248.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2019-11-18
Total views
17 ( #584,526 of 2,401,674 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #361,899 of 2,401,674 )
2019-11-18
Total views
17 ( #584,526 of 2,401,674 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #361,899 of 2,401,674 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads
