Moore's Problem

Moore’s problem or Moore’s ‘paradox’ arises from the fact that consistent propositions of the form of and : It is raining but I believe it is not raining It is raining but I don’t believe it is raining strike us as being contradictory. Shoemaker explained this oddity by producing a proof that belief in such sentences is either inconsistent or self-refuting. For Sorensen many propositional attitudes have scopes smaller than the class of consistent propositions. Inaccessible consistent propositions are ‘blindspots’. Moore-propositions are the blindspots of belief. According to either, Moore-propositions are unbelievable. I argue that Moore-propositions are actually believable.
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