Papineau on the Vagueness of Phenomenal Concepts

Dialectica 60 (4):475-483 (2006)
Authors
Michael Antony
University of Haifa
Abstract
Papineau’s argument in Thinking About Consciousness for the vagueness or indeterminacy of phenomenal concepts is discussed. Several problems with his argument are brought out, and it is concluded that his argument fails to establish his desired conclusion.
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DOI 10.1111/dltc.2006.60.issue-4
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References found in this work BETA

Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness.Michael V. Antony - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538.
The Harder Problem of Consciousness.Ned Block - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391.
Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):171-186.
Philosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):657-665.

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