Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness

Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538 (2006)
Abstract
An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct , then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false--?namely versions of the identity theory, functionalism, and dualism that appeal to complex physical or functional properties in identification, realization, or correlation. Reasons are also given for taking seriously the claim that our current concept conscious state is sharp. The paper ends by surveying the theoretical options left open by the concept's sharpness and the truth of the conditional argued for in the paper.
Keywords Consciousness  Dualism  Functionalism  Metaphysics  Vagueness
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-7488-8
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References found in this work BETA

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Essays on Actions and Events. Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
The Things We Mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Hard Problem of the Many.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):449-468.

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