Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538 (2006)
AbstractAn argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct , then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false--?namely versions of the identity theory, functionalism, and dualism that appeal to complex physical or functional properties in identification, realization, or correlation. Reasons are also given for taking seriously the claim that our current concept conscious state is sharp. The paper ends by surveying the theoretical options left open by the concept's sharpness and the truth of the conditional argued for in the paper.
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Citations of this work
Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function.David J. Chalmers & Kelvin J. McQueen - forthcoming - In Shan Gao (ed.), Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics. Oxford University Press.
Vagueness and Zombies: Why ‘Phenomenally Conscious’ has No Borderline Cases.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2105-2123.
Materialism and the Moral Status of Animals.Jonathan Birch - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):795-815.
This Quintessence of Dust - Consciousness Explained, at Thirty.Jared Warren - 2021 - Philosophical Papers 50 (1-2):281-308.
References found in this work
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.