Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness

Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538 (2006)
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Abstract

An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct , then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false--?namely versions of the identity theory, functionalism, and dualism that appeal to complex physical or functional properties in identification, realization, or correlation. Reasons are also given for taking seriously the claim that our current concept conscious state is sharp. The paper ends by surveying the theoretical options left open by the concept's sharpness and the truth of the conditional argued for in the paper.

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References found in this work

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - London and New York: Routledge.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.
Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Things We Mean.Stephen R. Schiffer - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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