Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness

Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538 (2006)
Abstract
An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct , then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false--?namely versions of the identity theory, functionalism, and dualism that appeal to complex physical or functional properties in identification, realization, or correlation. Reasons are also given for taking seriously the claim that our current concept conscious state is sharp. The paper ends by surveying the theoretical options left open by the concept's sharpness and the truth of the conditional argued for in the paper.
Keywords Consciousness  Dualism  Functionalism  Metaphysics  Vagueness
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-7488-8
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,191
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.
The Things We Mean.Stephen R. Schiffer - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Vagueness: A Reader.Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.) - 1997 - MIT Press.
No Fact of the Matter.Hartry Field - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):457 – 480.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Vagueness and the Philosophy of Perception.Ryan Perkins - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
Is Consciousness Vague or Arbitrary?Michael Tye - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):679-685.
Consciousness, Neural Functionalism, Real Subjectivity.Ted Honderich - 1995 - American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):369-381.
Consciousness and Self-Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - The Monist 87 (2):182-205.
Self-Consciousness.George Bealer - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.
Understanding Consciousness, Edition 2.Max Velmans - 2009 - Routledge/Psychology Press.
Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox.Terence Horgan - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):159-188.
Vagueness, Logic and the Computational View of Mind.Wayne Richard Dewitt - 1988 - Dissertation, The Ohio State University
Varieties of Vagueness.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):145-157.
Metaphysics of Consciousness, and David Chalmers's Property Dualism.Chhanda Chakraborti - 2002 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19 (2):59-84.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

372 ( #7,256 of 2,172,602 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #56,362 of 2,172,602 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums