What's in a function?

Synthese 107 (2):167 - 204 (1996)
Abstract
In this paper we argue that Revision Rules, introduced by Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap as a tool for the analysis of the concept of truth, also provide a useful tool for defining computable functions. This also makes good on Gupta's and Belnap's claim that Revision Rules provide a general theory of definition, a claim for which they supply only the example of truth. In particular we show how Revision Rules arise naturally from relaxing and generalizing a classical construction due to Kleene, and indicate how they can be employed to reconstruct the class of the general recursive functions. We also point at how Revision Rules can be employed to access non-minimal fixed points of partially defined computing procedures.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413605
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.

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