Plato and the Self-Predication Assumption

Dissertation, University of Minnesota (1980)

A prevalent view among scholars is that Plato believed the Self-Predication Assumption. I argue that Plato did not hold this assumption. First, I consider the evidence in Plato's text for the Self-Predication Assumption, and find it inconclusive. Second, I argue that at different times, Plato held two different theories of predication, each of which is inconsistent with the Self-Predication Assumption. Finally, I examine the first part of Plato's Parmenides and argue that there is no need to find the Self-Predication Assumption there, not even in the Third Man Argument
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