Fodor, modularity, and speech perception

Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):317-330 (1998)
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Abstract

Fodor argues that speech perception is accomplished by a module. Typically, modular processing is taken to be bottom-up processing. Yet there is ubiquitous empirical evidence that speech perception is influenced by top-down processing. Fodor attempts to resolve this conflict by denying that modular processing must be exclusively bottom-up. It is argued, however, that Fodor's attempt to reconcile top-down and modular processing fails, because: (i) it undermines Fodor's own conception of modular processing; and (ii) it cannot account for the contextually varying top-down influences that characterize speech perception

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Citations of this work

Do we hear meanings? – between perception and cognition.Anna Drożdżowicz - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (x):1-33.
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Philosophy meets the neurosciences.William Bechtel, Pete Mandik & Jennifer Mundale - 2001 - In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.
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References found in this work

The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.

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