On the Right to Lie

Russian Studies in Philosophy 48 (3):9-25 (2009)
Abstract
The author questions the validity of Kant's insistence on the absoluteness of the requirement "Do not lie" as well as the very possibility of absolute moral principles in general. He argues for applied ethics, the object of which would be individual-situational behavior and the rules and requirements of which have a concrete situational character. He points out that Kant's insistence on the absoluteness contradicts the humanity imperative, especially its requirement to treat others as an end in itself. He stresses that the requirement of the unconditional impermissibility of lying leads to a concealed justification of treachery, which should be considered another type of lying
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Reprint years 2010
DOI 10.2753/RSP1061-1967480301
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