Mental particulars, mental events, and the bundle theory

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (March):109-120 (1979)
I argue, First, That the bundle theory is compatible with certain views of mental states as alterations in an underlying substance. Then I distinguish between momentary and enduring experiencers and argue that the bundle theory does not imply the possibility of experiences apart from experiencers, But at most apart from enduring experiencers. Finally, I reject strawson's claim that the bundle theory implies that some particular person's experience might instead have belonged to some other person. Regarding experiences as events rather than peculiar sorts of particulars facilitates each of these points
Keywords Event  Experience  Individuation  Mental  Metaphysics  Mind  Particulars  Self  Armstrong, D  Hume
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.1979.10716239
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