Acerca de la polémica Neurath-Horkheimer: ciencia y política

Dianoia 59 (72):113-129 (2014)
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Abstract

En este trabajo se expone el debate entre Neurath y Horkheimer como ejemplo de recuperación de los aspectos políticos del Círculo de Viena, olvidados en la visión tradicional, que ayudarán a tener una mejor comprensión de las diversas posiciones de los miembros del Círculo. Se intenta mostrar que gran parte del debate se debe a las diferencias políticas entre los contendientes y a sus diferentes concepciones sobre la filosofía, la ciencia y la razón, pero no a la falta de intereses políticos de Neurath y del Círculo de Viena. In this work we will summarize the Neurath-Horkheimer debate as an example of the recovery of the Vienna Circle's political aspects that were forgotten in the traditional view, so as to achieve a better understanding of the different positions assumed by the Circle's members. Our intention is to show that much of this debate stems from their political differences and the contenders' diverse conceptions of philosophy, science and reason, but not from the lack of political interests in Neurath and the Vienna Circle

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