Beyond Logical Pluralism and Logical Monism

Logica Universalis 14 (2):151-174 (2020)
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Abstract

Logical pluralism as a thesis that more than one logic is correct seems very plausible for two basic reasons. First, there are so many logical systems on the market today. And it is unclear how we should decide which of them gets the logical rules right. On the other hand, logical monism as the opposite thesis still seems plausible, as well, because of normativity of logic. An approach which would manage to bring a synthesis of both logical pluralism and logical monism is called for. I review the possible forms of logical pluralism and render them more plausible. I thus arrive at logical dynamism, a synthesis of various pluralisms and monism focused on how logic develops.

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Pavel Arazim
Charles University, Prague (PhD)

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References found in this work

Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism.Robert Brandom - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
What are logical notions?Alfred Tarski - 1986 - History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (2):143-154.
Making sense of logical pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):433-454.

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