Cognitive phenomenology and metacognitive feelings

Mind and Language (forthcoming)
Authors
Santiago Arango-Munoz
Universidad de Antioquia
Abstract
The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states such as believ- ing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip-of-the-tongue phe- nomenon can be considered as a clear-cut instance of non- sensory cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews Goldman's proposal and assesses whether the tip-of-the- tongue and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt on the idea that the tip-of-the-tongue and other metacognitive feelings are clear-cut instances of cognitive phenomenology.
Keywords bodily feelings  cognitive phenomenology  feeling of knowing  introspection  metacognitive feelings  tip‐of‐the‐tongue phenomenon
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12215
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.
The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1):1-36.

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