Mind and Language 34 (2):247-262 (2019)
AbstractThe cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states such as believ- ing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip-of-the-tongue phe- nomenon can be considered as a clear-cut instance of non- sensory cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews Goldman's proposal and assesses whether the tip-of-the- tongue and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt on the idea that the tip-of-the-tongue and other metacognitive feelings are clear-cut instances of cognitive phenomenology.
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Citations of this work
The Phenomenology of Remembering Is an Epistemic Feeling.Denis Perrin, Kourken Michaelian & André Sant’Anna - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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Epistemic Feelings, Metacognition, and the Lima Problem.Nathaniel Greely - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6803-6825.
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References found in this work
The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa. pp. 520--533.
The Phenomenology of Cognition: Or What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.
How We Know Our Own Minds: The Relationship Between Mindreading and Metacognition.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):121-138.