From Collective Memory ... to Collective Metamemory?

In Anika Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 11. pp. 195-217 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Ouraiminthischapteristodelineatetheformofsharedagencythatwe take to be manifested in collective memory. We argue for two theses. First, we argue that, given a relatively weak conception of episodicity, certain small-scale groups display a form of emergent (i.e., genuinely collective) episodic memory, while large-scale groups, in contrast, do not display emergent episodic memory. Second, we argue that this form of emergent memory presupposes (high-level and possibly low-level) metamemorial capacities, capacities that are, however, not themselves emergent group-level features but rather strictly individual-level features. The form of shared agency that we delineate is thus revealed as being minimal in three senses. First, the relevant groups are themselves minimal in terms of their size. Second, the form of memory in question is minimally episodic. And finally, the cognitive capac- ities attributed to the relevant groups are minimal, in the sense that they need not themselves be capable of metacognition.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-09-12

Downloads
860 (#23,068)

6 months
131 (#36,850)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Santiago Arango-Munoz
Universidad de Antioquia

Citations of this work

Group navigation and procedural metacognition.Pablo Fernández Velasco - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (5):1058-1076.

Add more citations