Identity of Dynamic Meanings

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 22 (64):69-90 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Inferentialism has brought important insights into the nature of meanings. It breaks with the representationalist tradition that sees meanings as constituted primarily by representing some extra-linguistic reality. Yet the break with tradition should be pursued further. Inferentialists still regard meanings as static, and they still do not entirely abandon the idea of fully determined meaning. Following Davidon’s ideas about meanings as constituted only in the course of a specific conversation, I propose a dynamic account of what meanings are. They are described as entities belonging to the dynamic realm of Henri Bergson’s duration. The inhabitants of this realm live in constant movement and development which is more essential to them than the stages that this development goes through. My account brings about a rejection of the notion of the strict literal meaning and therewith also of the contrasting notions such as ambiguity. Meaning is understood as a dynamic entity that is characterized rather by its history than by its nature.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,031

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles


Added to PP

18 (#858,958)

6 months
8 (#416,172)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Pavel Arazim
Charles University, Prague (PhD)

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

How to do things with words.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - New York: Routledge.
Literal Meaning.François Récanati - 2002 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Making it Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.

View all 20 references / Add more references