Authors
Alfred Archer
Tilburg University
Abstract
Are aesthetic judgements cognitive, belief-like states or non-cognitive, desire-like states? There have been a number of attempts in recent years to evaluate the plausibility of a non-cognitivist theory of aesthetic judgements. These attempts borrow heavily from non-cognitivism in metaethics. One argument that is used to support metaethical non-cognitivism is the argument from Motivational Judgement Internalism. It is claimed that accepting this view, together with a plausible theory of motivation, pushes us towards accepting non-cognitivism. A tempting option, then, for those wishing to defend aesthetic non-cognitivism, would be to appeal to a similar argument. However, both Caj Strandberg and Walter Sinnott-Armstong have argued that Internalism is a less plausible claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements by raising objections against aesthetic internalism. In this paper, I will argue that both of these objections can be raised against internalism about moral judgements as well. As a result, internalism is no less plausible a claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements. I will then show how a theory of internalism about normative judgements in general is capable of avoiding both of these objections.
Keywords aesthetics  metaethics  motivational judgement internalism
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DOI 10.1080/0020174x.2016.1272487
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References found in this work BETA

Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Harvard University Press.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Amoralist and the Anaesthetic.Alex King - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):632-663.
Aesthetic Supererogation.Alfred Archer & Lauren Ware - 2017 - Estetika 54 (1):102-116.
Epistemic Judgement and Motivation.Cameron Boult & Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):738-758.

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