Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):365-380 (2006)
This essay discusses Socrates’ use of hypothetical choices as an early version of what was to become in the twentieth century the discipline of decision theory as expressed by one of its prominent proponents, F. P. Ramsey. Socrates’ use of hypothetical choices and thought experiments in the dialogues is a way of reassuring himself of an interlocutor’s philosophical potential. For example, to assess just how far Alcibiades is willing to go to attain his goal of being a great Athenian leader, we employ Ramsey’s concept of Mathematical Expectation. Mathematical Expectation operates on the assumption that it is not enough to measure probability; we must also measure our belief to apportion our belief to the probability. In other words, it illustrates how strongly or to what degree a person holds a particular belief. If a person’s belief in X lacks enough doubts to cancel the belief out, the probability of his acting on this belief is higher than if his belief in X was plagued by a greater number of doubts
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy General Interest|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Alcibiades and Athens. A Study in Literary Presentation.Antonis Tsakmakis & D. Gribble - 2002 - Journal of Hellenic Studies 122:169.
The Framing of Socrates: The Literary Interpretation of Xenophon's Memorabilia.Vivienne Gray - 1998 - Franz Steiner.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Degree-of-Belief and Degree-of-Support: Why Bayesians Need Both Notions.James Hawthorne - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):277-320.
Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action.Donald Davidson - 1980 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:1-12.
Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F. P. Ramsey.Frank Plumpton Ramsey & D. H. Mellor (eds.) - 1980 - Cambridge University Press.
Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2009 - In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 491--506.
Objective Belief Functions as Induced Measures.Nakamura Yutaka - 2003 - Theory and Decision 55 (1):71-83.
From Bayesianism to the Epistemic View of Mathematics: Review of R. Jeffrey, Subjective Probability: The Real Thing. [REVIEW]J. Williamson - 2006 - Philosophia Mathematica 14 (3):365-369.
Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
De Finetti Was Right: Probability Does Not Exist.Robert F. Nau - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):89-124.
Ordinal Conditional Functions. A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States.Wolfgang Spohn - 1988 - In W. L. Harper & B. Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics, vol. II. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Added to index2010-09-14
Total downloads21 ( #238,029 of 2,171,798 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #173,730 of 2,171,798 )
How can I increase my downloads?