Carnapian Lessons for Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic

History and Philosophy of Logic 44 (1):54-65 (2023)
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Abstract

This paper aims at disentangling two distinct problems in present philosophy of logic: the a priori/a posteriori divide and the theory choice problem. A confusion of these problems is present in the heart of current anti-exceptionalism about logic, as the use of a posteriori methods is identified with theory choice. We illustrate how the division may be preserved in a version of anti-exceptionalism by discussing Carnap’s approach, which had both an a priori epistemology and a pragmatic account of logical theory choice. This contributes to illuminate the claim that the current understanding is mistaken in considering Carnap as an exceptionalist, and it also helps us to address one of the difficulties of current anti-exceptionalism, to know, that, by equating a posteriori with theory choice, it requires appeal to framework-independent facts. We suggest that the pragmatic account of both Quine and Carnap to theory choice was advanced precisely to avoid that kind of difficulty.

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Author Profiles

Jonas R. B. Arenhart
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
Ivan Ferreira da Cunha
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

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References found in this work

Anti-exceptionalism about logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.
What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):250-282.
Limits of Abductivism About Logic.Ulf Hlobil - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):320-340.

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