Weak Discernibility in Quantum Mechanics: Does It Save PII?

Axiomathes 23 (3):461-484 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Weak Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (weak PII), states that numerically distinct items must be discernible by a symmetrical and irreflexive relation. Recently, some authors have proposed that weak PII holds in non relativistic quantum mechanics, contradicting a long tradition claiming PII to be simply false in that theory. The question that arises then is: are relations allowed in the scope of PII? In this paper, we propose that quantum mechanics does not help us in deciding matters concerning that problem, since that is a metaphysical problem rather than a quantum mechanical one. We argue further that weak PII is unmotivated on metaphysical grounds. We examine three metaphysical theses (bundle theory, counting, empiricism) that may provide reasons for one to sustain PII, and we conclude that weak PII gets no independent motivation from them

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,480

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Discerning Elementary Particles.F. A. Muller & M. P. Seevinck - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (2):179-200.
Exclusion Principle and the Identity of Indiscernibles: A Response to Margenau's Argument.Michela Massimi - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2):303--30.
Discerning Fermions.Simon Saunders & F. A. Muller - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):499 - 548.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-04-03

Downloads
134 (#92,137)

6 months
4 (#172,016)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonas R. B. Arenhart
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina