Abstract

In the conviction that some problems in the philosophy of science arise from the use of inadequate metaphysical frameworks, the work begins with an outline of some features of the relation between metaphysics and sciences, and uses historical examples to illustrate inadequate metaphysics leading to scientific conundrums. One recurrent problem has been use of metaphysics which are 'dead', i.e. which lack an ontological category of activity. The work then proceeds to describe a minimal metaphysics which includes as one of the basic ontological categories a source of 'activity' in the form of 'powers'. ;This work presents an account of scientific laws which circumvents many of the standard objections to scientific law accounts. It also presents a two parameter taxonomic classification of many existing law accounts in terms of what the law account seeks to accomplish, and which ontological or epistemological building block the account employs. In addition, the work presents a critique of two important contemporary law accounts, namely the Systematic Account advocated by Mill-Ramsey-Lewis, and the Essentialist Accounts as advocated by Tooley, Swoyer and others. By comparing and contrasting the law account presented in this work with these other law accounts the strengths of the former are accentuated. Further, it is argued that this law account is firmly in the empiricist tradition, since it shuns use of essences of 'higher' metaphysical order, and so on. ;The work also briefly shows how an account of scientific explanations can be offered using that same apparatus developed earlier. In brief, a 'reified' version of the Deductive-Nomological explanation account is presented in which the covering law is nomic in the sense of the law account presented in this work. The resulting explanation account avoids many of the paradoxes associated with the Deductive-Nomological account, while retaining the intuitive appeal of this venerable theory