Sticking up for oedipus: Fodor on intentional generalizations and broad content

Mind and Language 11 (3):231-45 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In The Elm and the Expert, Jerry Fodor tries to reconcile three philosophical positions he is presently committed to: a computational theory of mind, intentional realism and a denotational theory of meaning. One problem he faces is this: a denotational semantics, according to which the meaning of a singular term like a name is exhausted by its referent, seems to rule out there being true intentional generalizations, or generalizations which advert to the contents of a subject's mental states. That there are such true generalizations is a major element in Fodor's intentional realism. Accordingly, Fodor is forced to find a way of dissolving this apparent incompatibility. This paper looks at his attempts to do so and concludes that they fail.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Concepts: Where Fodor went wrong.A. Levine & Mark H. Bickhard - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):5-23.
Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations?Murat Aydede & Philip Robbins - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.
Meaning holism and intentional content.Arnold Silverberg - 1994 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1):29-53.
Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics.Barry M. Loewer (ed.) - 1991 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
Two routes to narrow content: Both dead ends.Pat A. Manfredi - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22.
Fodor's modal argument.Frederick Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
79 (#192,733)

6 months
2 (#668,348)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dennis Arjo
Johnson County Community College

Citations of this work

The language of thought hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The edenic theory of reference.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):276-308.
Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations?Murat Aydede & Philip Robbins - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.
The computational theory of mind.Steven Horst - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations