Journal of Ethics 15 (4):405-424 (2011)
The paper has two goals. First, it defends one type of subjectivist account of reasons for actions—deliberative accounts—against the criticism that they commit the conditional fallacy. Second, it attempts to show that another type of subjectivist account of practical reasons that has been gaining popularity—ideal advisor accounts—are liable to commit a closely related error. Further, I argue that ideal advisor accounts can avoid the error only by accepting the fundamental theoretical motivation behind deliberative accounts. I conclude that ideal advisor accounts represent neither a substantial departure from, nor a substantial improvement upon, deliberative accounts
|Keywords||Reasons Ideal Advisor Bernard Williams advice model Michael Smith|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard A. Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Varieties of Reasons/Motives Internalism.Steven Arkonovich - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (3):210-219.
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