The Journal of Ethics 15 (4):405-424 (2011)

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Abstract
The paper has two goals. First, it defends one type of subjectivist account of reasons for actions—deliberative accounts—against the criticism that they commit the conditional fallacy. Second, it attempts to show that another type of subjectivist account of practical reasons that has been gaining popularity—ideal advisor accounts—are liable to commit a closely related error. Further, I argue that ideal advisor accounts can avoid the error only by accepting the fundamental theoretical motivation behind deliberative accounts. I conclude that ideal advisor accounts represent neither a substantial departure from, nor a substantial improvement upon, deliberative accounts
Keywords Reasons  Ideal Advisor  Bernard Williams  advice model  Michael Smith
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DOI 10.1007/s10892-011-9101-7
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References found in this work BETA

The Moral Problem.Michael Smith (ed.) - 1994 - Wiley.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.

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Citations of this work BETA

Varieties of Reasons/Motives Internalism.Steven Arkonovich - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (3):210-219.
Why Moral Status Matters for Metaethics.Caroline T. Arruda - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (4):471-490.

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