Studia Logica 86 (3):353 - 373 (2007)
The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, we do not need to assume that rationality is commonly known (as is done in [Aumann (1995)]) or commonly hypothesized by the players (as done in [Samet (1996)]). The proposed model is compared with the account of hypothetical knowledge presented by Samet in [Samet (1996)] and with other possible strategies for extending information structures with conditional propositions
|Keywords||Philosophy Computational Linguistics Mathematical Logic and Foundations Logic|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Logic of Conditionals: An Application of Probability to Deductive Logic.Ernest W. Adams - 1975 - D. Reidel Pub. Co..
Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (3):297-315.
Belief Revisions and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals.Peter Gärdenfors - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (1):81-93.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Common Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information.Philip J. Reny - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:363 - 369.
Inconsistencies in Extensive Games.Martin Dufwenberg & Johan Lindén - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (1):103 - 114.
Synchronic Information, Knowledge and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games.Giacomo Bonanno - 1999 - Research in Economics 53 (1):77-99.
Belief Revision in Games of Perfect Information.Thorsten Clausing - 2004 - Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):89-115.
Backward Induction Without Common Knowledge.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:329 - 343.
Players' Information in Extensive Games.Giacomo Bonanno - 1992 - Mathematical Social Sciences 24 (1):35-48.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads59 ( #88,761 of 2,168,195 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #187,094 of 2,168,195 )
How can I increase my downloads?