Knowing and supposing in games of perfect information

Studia Logica 86 (3):353 - 373 (2007)
Abstract
The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, we do not need to assume that rationality is commonly known (as is done in [Aumann (1995)]) or commonly hypothesized by the players (as done in [Samet (1996)]). The proposed model is compared with the account of hypothetical knowledge presented by Samet in [Samet (1996)] and with other possible strategies for extending information structures with conditional propositions
Keywords Philosophy   Computational Linguistics   Mathematical Logic and Foundations   Logic
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11225-007-9065-6
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,590
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1968 - Americal Philosophical Quarterly:98-112.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Common Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information.Philip J. Reny - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:363 - 369.
Belief Revision in Games of Perfect Information.Thorsten Clausing - 2004 - Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):89-115.
Backward Induction Without Common Knowledge.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:329 - 343.
Players' Information in Extensive Games.Giacomo Bonanno - 1992 - Mathematical Social Sciences 24 (1):35-48.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

59 ( #88,761 of 2,168,195 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #187,094 of 2,168,195 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums