Against Ostrich Nominalism: a Reply to Michael Devitt


Abstract
In my reply to michael devitt, It is argued, First, That quine fails to appreciate the force of plato's "one over many" argument for universals. It is argued, Second, That quine's failure springs in part at least from his doctrine of ontological commitment: from the view that predicates need not be treated with ontological seriousness. Finally, An attempt is made to blunt the force of devitt's contention that realists cannot give a coherent explanation of the way that universals stand to particulars
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How to Unify.Nicholas K. Jones - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
There is No 'Truthmaker' Argument Against Nominalism.Josh Parsons - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):325 – 334.

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