Philosophical Topics 21 (1):1-20 (1993)

Authors
Brad Armendt
Arizona State University
Abstract
One guide to an argument's significance is the number and variety of refutations it attracts. By this measure, the Dutch book argument has considerable importance.2 Of course this measure alone is not a sure guide to locating arguments deserving of our attention—if a decisive refutation has really been given, we are better off pursuing other topics. But the presence of many and varied counterarguments at least suggests that either the refutations are controversial, or that their target admits of more than one interpretation, or both. The main point of this paper is to focus on a way of understanding the Dutch Book argument (DBA) that avoids many of the well-known criticisms, and to consider how it fares against an important criticism that still remains: the objection that the DBA presupposes value-independence of bets.
Keywords bayesianism  dutch book argument  subjective probability  representation theorems
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0276-2080
DOI 10.5840/philtopics19932111
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Probability and Partial Belief.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1929 - In Frank Ramsey (ed.), Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press. pp. 95-96.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.
What Are Degrees of Belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.
Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 229--251.
Dutch Book Arguments.Susan Vineberg - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability.J. Williamson - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):401-416.
De Finetti, Countable Additivity, Consistency and Coherence.Colin Howson - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):1-23.
Countable Additivity and the de Finetti Lottery.Paul Bartha - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):301-321.
Dutch Strategies for Diachronic Rules: When Believers See the Sure Loss Coming.Brad Armendt - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:217 - 229.
Hidden Assumptions in the Dutch Book Argument.C. Waidacher - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (3):293-312.
Is There a Dutch Book Argument for Probability Kinematics?Brad Armendt - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (4):583-588.
Beauty and the Bets.Christopher Hitchcock - 2004 - Synthese 139 (3):405 - 420.
Dutch Books and Agent Rationality.Daniel Silber - 1999 - Theory and Decision 47 (3):247-266.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
317 ( #22,633 of 2,340,325 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
45 ( #14,027 of 2,340,325 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes