Minimalism, the generalization problem and the liar

Synthese 139 (3):491 - 512 (2004)
Authors
Bradley Armour-Garb
State University of New York (SUNY)
Abstract
In defense of the minimalist conception of truth, Paul Horwich(2001) has recently argued that our acceptance of the instances of the schema,`the proposition that p is true if and only if p', suffices to explain our acceptanceof truth generalizations, that is, of general claims formulated using the truth predicate.In this paper, I consider the strategy Horwich develops for explaining our acceptance of truth generalizations. As I show, while perhaps workable on its own, the strategy is in conflictwith his response to the liar paradox. Something must give. I consider and reject variousalternatives and emendations to the strategy. In order to resolve the conflict,I propose an alternative approach to the liar, one that supports Horwich's strategywhile leaving minimalism maximally uncompromised.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.1023/B:SYNT.0000024891.87160.c3
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Epistemicism and the Liar.Jamin Asay - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):679-699.
In Defence of Radical Restrictionism.David Liggins - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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