Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (21):33-63 (2012)

Authors
Bradley Armour-Garb
State University of New York, Albany
James Woodbridge
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Abstract
In this paper, we show how an internal tension in Wilfrid Sellars’s understanding of truth, as well as an external tension in his account of meaning attribution, can be resolved while adhering to a Sellarsian spirit, by appealing to the particular fictionalist accounts of truth-talk and proposition-talk that we have developed elsewhere
Keywords truth  correspondence  deflationism  meaning attribution  propositions  Sellars  inferentialism  fictionalism
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References found in this work BETA

Putnam’s Paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
Go Figure: A Path Through Fictionalism.Stephen Yablo - 2001 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):72–102.
Hermeneutic Fictionalism.Jason Stanley - 2001 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):36–71.
Language Created, Language Independent Entities.Stephen Shiffer - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (1):149-167.

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