Semantic defectiveness and the liar

Philosophical Studies 164 (3):845-863 (2013)
Abstract
In this paper, we do two things. First, we provide some support for adopting a version of the meaningless strategy with respect to the liar paradox, and, second, we extend that strategy, by providing, albeit tentatively, a solution to that paradox—one that is semantic, rather than logical.
Keywords Truth  Liar paradox  Pretense  Expressibility
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9915-6
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References found in this work BETA
Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
When Truth Gives Out.Mark Richard - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Truth and the Absence of Fact.Hartry Field - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
On Referring.P. F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.

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