Philosophical Studies 164 (3):845-863 (2013)

Bradley Armour-Garb
State University of New York, Albany
In this paper, we do two things. First, we provide some support for adopting a version of the meaningless strategy with respect to the liar paradox, and, second, we extend that strategy, by providing, albeit tentatively, a solution to that paradox—one that is semantic, rather than logical.
Keywords Truth  Liar paradox  Pretense  Expressibility
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9915-6
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References found in this work BETA

Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
When Truth Gives Out.Mark Richard - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Syntactic Structures.J. F. Staal - 1966 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (2):245-251.
Truth and the Absence of Fact.Hartry Field - 2001 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

From One to Many: Recent Work on Truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.
Fragmented Truth.Andy Demfree Yu - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxford

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