Singular thoughts and singular propositions

Philosophical Studies 154 (2):205 - 222 (2011)
Abstract
A singular thought about an object o is one that is directly about o in a characteristic way—grasp of that thought requires having some special epistemic relation to the object o, and the thought is ontologically dependent on o. One account of the nature of singular thought exploits a Russellian Structured Account of Propositions, according to which contents are represented by means of structured n-tuples of objects, properties, and functions. A proposition is singular, according to this framework, if and only if it contains an object as a constituent. One advantage of the framework of Russellian Structured propositions is that it promises to provide a metaphysical basis for the notion of a singular thought about an object, grounding it in terms of constituency. In this paper, we argue that the attempt to ground the peculiar features of singular thoughts in terms of metaphysical constituency fails, and draw some consequences of our discussion for other debates
Keywords Singular thought  Propositions  Vagueness
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Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Demonstratives.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.

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Hallucinating Real Things.Steven P. James - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3711-3732.

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