Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):159 – 166 (2006)
This paper argues that the foundations of our knowledge are the bed-rock certainties of ordinary life, what may be called the Moorean truths. Beyond that are the well-established results within the empirical sciences, and whatever has been proved in the rational sciences of mathematics and logic. Otherwise there is only belief, which may be more or less rational. A moral drawn from this is that dogmatism should be moderated on all sides
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In Defence of Error Theory.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):209-230.
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Unger's Argument for Skepticism Revisited.Igor Douven & Diederik Olders - 2008 - Theoria 74 (3):239-250.
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