The scope and limits of human knowledge

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):159 – 166 (2006)

This paper argues that the foundations of our knowledge are the bed-rock certainties of ordinary life, what may be called the Moorean truths. Beyond that are the well-established results within the empirical sciences, and whatever has been proved in the rational sciences of mathematics and logic. Otherwise there is only belief, which may be more or less rational. A moral drawn from this is that dogmatism should be moderated on all sides
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DOI 10.1080/00048400600758896
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In Defence of Error Theory.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):209-230.
Truthmakers and Modality.Ross Paul Cameron - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):261 - 280.
Paraphrase, Semantics, and Ontology.John A. Keller - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 9.
On Two Main Themes in Gutting's What Philosophers Know.William G. Lycan - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):112-120.

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